Louis_J_Sheehan

No. 586

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Berlin # 707.

(Shanghai to Tokyo # 1283) Re your Circular # 1482 [a].

If one should try to classify or group the German diplomatic officials (mostly consular officials) in China, there would be two kinds. (1) Those who place emphasis upon political concert between Japan, Germany and Manchuria from the viewpoint of its larger aspects, and are trying to handle the various matters that arise in China with due regard to this viewpoint. (2) Those who are inclined to place the emphasis upon the protection of their own immediate financial and commercial interests, and therefore in the handling of matters do not necessarily take an attitude that is in harmony with our plans. The former group is limited to a small number of Nazi trained men, whereas the majority who have served in China for many years belong to the second group. However, it would not be right to think of all the latter as being anti-Japanese. Likewise in the former group there seems to be a tendency, as they stay on in China and experience friction with us over restrictions on the shipping in or out of commodities, and restrictions in matters of residence and transit, for them to reach the place where they do not consistently entertain good feelings toward us.

The problem from now on, since the German officials have secured the right of direct approach to the Nanking Government, by virtue of the recognition of that government, will lie in the “delicate” relations that will arise between these officials and us, and the Nanking Government officials. Looking at it from the standpoint of these officials, those of which we will need to be most cautious, are those of the first group rather than those of the second group.

All the German diplomatic officials here, with the exception of Acting Consul General TINSAA (the one of whom the Ecuador government took exception because of his being such an extreme Nazi, who recently was transferred here, and, when Fischer was transferred to Nanking, became Acting Consul General) would be placed in the above mentioned second group, and rather than for us here to try to handle the German officials personally I think it would be proper to have Berlin send instructions, now that Germany has recognized the Nanking Government, for all the German diplomatic officials and for the German businessmen who are back of them to be careful of any anti-Japanese and pro-Chungking conduct. (As for example, the disguising (?) and registry-transfer of enemy ships, the violation of rules concerning the shipping in and out of commodities, and of —— which there has been a good deal of late by the German merchants.) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-20-41

A-300

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 587

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

TO: Berlin # 1549.

Circular.

Message to Nanking #300.

(Part 1 of 2) .

1. We may expect that it would be necessary, after the establishment of a new order in the Far East as well as in Europe, to arrange a new economic treaty between Germany and China, based on the recognition of the leading position of Japan and Germany in that new order. However, inasmuch as a large scale war is still being fought in China, even if at this time a comprehensive and agreement is concluded, we cannot expect it to be satisfactorily applied. It seems to me that it would be best if, as individual questions come up, their friendly settlements could be effected in a realistic manner under a close agreement and contact maintained between Japan, Germany and China. If it is the desire of the German Government to come to an agreement with China because of the existence of a “pro memoria” and because of the various circumstances, it might be well to arrange a provisional agreement between Germany and China which will include two or three clauses (for example, relative to internal taxes, etc.,) in addition to those clauses contained in the present German-Chinese treaty and agreement; namely, those-having to do with manufacturing and commercial enterprises and exporting and importing. Then, for Japan and Germany to arrive at a compromise by concluding an agreement including such principles as German cooperation during the war with our plans; respect for the special relations obtaining between Japan, Manchukuo and China; and the granting of advantages over those granted to any third power in the sphere in which the respective signatories enjoy leadership. In any case, my opinion is that the time is not ripe for concluding a very comprehensive agreement. http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 588

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

TO: Peking, and Shanghai # 1549.

Circular.

Message to Nanking #300.

(Part 2 of 2).

2. The Imperial Government has definitely promised to abolish extraterritorial rights as soon as the relations between Japan and China improve to a sufficient degree. Advancing as she is along with Germany toward the establishment of a new order, it goes without saying that in guiding the new People’s Government, Japan must so influence the Government, during the intermediary period leading up to the abolition of the extra territorial rights, that it will accord as favorable a treatment as possible to the Germans with a view of improving the latter’s position. http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US Therefore, I would like to have definite measures instituted after consulting the German authorities on individual cases. (I have in the past received various complaints from FISCHER [a] relative to the treatment being accorded by the Concession Court in Shanghai to the Germans. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

A-301

It is not clear to me what concrete instances he refers to, nor do I know how close a contact is being maintained between FISCHER and his own country).

Relayed to —– and Berlin.

[a] German Consul General in Shanghai.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 589

FROM: Peking July 22, 1941

TO: Nanking and Shanghai # 324.

Circular.

(Message to Tokyo #465).

I gather that in your opinion it would be feasible to permit the Germans to conclude with China some very simple agreement stipulating the principle of most-favored nation treatment in case Berlin must and will have it so. As you know, the North China-Mongolian border occupies a special position as an area of joint Japanese-Chinese policy. Nothing at all however evanescent, must be done which would have a grave effect upon this area’s status: I know that you are sufficiently shrewd to handle the matter adroitly, but please be guided by this conception. http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US

Sent to NANDAI and to SHANGHAI.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 590

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 17, 1941

TO: Berlin # 657.

Re your # 898 [a]:

With regard to the Japan-U. S. negotiations, we have not been pressing the United States for an understanding. As a matter of fact, no concrete steps had been taken by us since the latter part of June when we received the final proposal issued by the United States, until very recently. Finally, however, the liaison conference was able to come to a preliminary agreement, and our revised proposal will be submitted, probably within the next day or two.

During this period, both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo have been urging me to give them a hint as to the contents of the United States proposal. As was the case previously, it was obvious that Japan would not accept the extremely slip-shod proposals made by the United States. We were afraid that if we released the U.S. proposal in confidence to Germany and Italy, it may have given rise to misunderstandings. Therefore, we advised the German and Italian Ambassadors that, as had been done before, we wished to discuss the matter ourselves first, and as soon as we had made a decision, we would inform them without delay. We will advise you and the Ambassador in Italy, in the same manner .

The negotiations referred to here have considerable bearing on our domestic as well as foreign policies and, therefore, we cannot discontinue them abruptly. On the other hand, there

A-302

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

are still considerable differences of opinion between the United States and Japan. Since we insist that any agreement with the United States must be based on the Tripartite Pact, there is very little chance of successfully concluding an agreement. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The above is for only your information.

[a] Not available.